Some people were on the pitch. They thought it was all over. It was then, when Lionel Messi crossed, when Lautaro Martinez headed, when the Argentina substitutes charged towards the corner flag to celebrate. England’s bid to win the World Cup was over. Sixty years of hurt, sixty years since Hurst, England still see that tackle by Moore and Nobby dancing.
But it remains the case that the only time their men won a World Cup semi-final was when Bobby belted the ball; they have not reached a final since. For half an hour, it seemed that Anthony Gordon would join Bobby Charlton in a select band, of England players to score the winner in this stage. For a quarter of an hour, it seemed like Bobby Moore’s tackle on Pele would be accompanied by mentions of Djed Spence’s thunderous challenge to prevent Giuliano Simeone from shooting.
Jordan Pickford had his Gordon Banks moment, too, a wonderful save from Nico Gonzalez. And yet, ultimately, each came in defeat; in years to come, these will be footnotes, not moments destined for English football folklore.
For Thomas Tuchel, the comparison point is not Sir Alf Ramsey, his greatest predecessor, but his immediate one and still England’s second finest ever manager, Gareth Southgate. England have had their second best decade ever; but it would have been better if they could hold on to leads on the major stages. This completed a hat-trick: after Croatia in the 2018 semi-final, after Italy in the Euro 2020 final.
Twice when it mattered, Southgate’s sides could not keep the ball. Tuchel’s team did not try. The decision was made to cede much of the pitch to Argentina, to try and reprise the heroic rearguard action in Mexico City: but with 11 men, not 10, earlier than seemed necessary.
England put their own backs against the wall. Tuchel went to a back five, but it backfired. And in a sense, it was a back six, with a sixth defender, in Nico O’Reilly, in a midfield that didn’t seem fit for purpose. They allowed Alexis Mac Allister the freedom to hit the woodwork twice, Enzo Fernandez the room to rifle in the equaliser. They liberated Messi. Just when it seemed his World Cup career was ending, he conjured two assists.
Removing Gordon, a workaholic of a goalscorer, had a logic, given his tendency to run himself into the ground, but by replacing him with Ezri Konsa, Tuchel took away England’s threat and when, including added time, there were still 27 minutes remaining. He summoned his special-ops agent, Dan Burn, perhaps sensing Messi’s nemesis might be a man about twice his height and who can head the ball half the length of the pitch. It wasn’t.
With each change, England handed the initiative to Argentina. They needed no second invitation. A nation with a historical grudge against England, a team with a fighting spirit that meant they would not relinquish their grasp on the World Cup. Argentina have a capacity to score late goals. Ask Cape Verde. Ask Egypt. Ask Switzerland. England may have been a higher-calibre of opponent but they suffered the same fate.
So Tuchel underlined how the FA’s imported managers somehow seem to end up being more English than the English. Sven-Goran Eriksson was wedded to 4-4-2. Fabio Capello was too. Tuchel changed shape but did not believe his players could keep the ball. He just looked to defend.
Different choices might not have produced a different result, but there were alternatives. Kobbie Mainoo, a passer of a midfielder, lingered unused all tournament. Adam Wharton, another, stayed at home. One winger who could have come on for Gordon, Bukayo Saka, did not get off the bench. Another, Marcus Rashford, only emerged in the 95th minute.
Tuchel could have considered the evidence from earlier on. Lionel Scaloni admitted that Switzerland’s physicality had troubled Argentina. Lisandro Martinez and Cristian Romero were booked for pulling back Brummies when Morgan Rogers and Jude Bellingham ran at them, but England stopped running at them. They ran scared, seeking sanctuary in their own box.
Argentina had sought to rile England. They provided echoes of the past by picking a Simeone, the winger showing that being an agent provocateur can run in the family. Yet Argentina prospered not by needling England, but by attacking them. Theirs was the response of champions.
England’s was the reaction of a team following Tuchel’s blueprint for holding on to a lead: defensive changes. Argentina could have predicted it: this was what they had done against Mexico and Norway. And, in the inquest, Tuchel may note that while Southgate was long faulted for his game management, he excelled in Euro 2024: with attacking changes, often involving Cole Palmer, another man left at home.
Maybe it is revisiting old arguments, but England ended with a limited team who showed their limitations. Leading Argentina in Atlanta was a great opportunity. For years, they will have Georgia on their mind. Perhaps for another 60 years.
